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Abstract
In this paper we present an approach to the co-
ordination of complex systems operating in a
multi-objective domain, which is an extention
of the dynamic weighted aggregation method
where the weightings are inﬂuenced by the de-
cision makers themselves. This is implemented
through an information theoretic voting model,
taking its inspiration from the political science
quantitative models of elections. The exam-
ple system presented shows this coordination
method, where voters vote for the parties (and
hence the weightings) corresponding to their
preferences, and parties update their policy
(weighting) positions learning from the voters.
1 Introduction
Most real world problems are multi-objective, with the
objectives often providing sources of conﬂict.
The decision problem, often referred to as an optimisa-
tion problem (from the decision maker’s point of view),
can be formulated as follows:
maxf(x)
where x = [x1,x2,x3....xn] is a vector of n decision
variables, and f(x) = [f1(x),f2(x),f3(x),...fn(x)] a vec-
tor of m objective functions, subject to the constraints
g(x) ∈ X. Note that optimisation may refer to minimi-
sation or some other deﬁnition of optimum.
1.1 Coordination in multi-objective
missions
The coordination of entities may be enforced (in a cen-
tralised system), through a central ‘controller’ who re-
ceives information from all entities and based on this
total information, then delegates commands (perhaps in
the form of actions). As the size of the system grows
in terms of both objectives and entities, it becomes in-
creasingly more diﬃcult and costly to manage such a
centralised system, hence decentralised approaches to co-
ordination become necessary.
In single and dual objective missions, decentralised ap-
proaches to coordination that have been put forward
have been primarily based on concepts of bargaining
and direct negotiations between entities, see for example
[Grocholsky, 2002].
When the number of objectives is extended, together
with a signiﬁcant increase in the number of entities,
it may become more eﬃcient to implement behaviour
based coordination strategies such as voting, whilst keep-
ing the system decentralised. One avenue which has
been extensively explored for decentralised coordination
of multiple entities with multiple objectives, is a free
market based approach, see the work of Stentz, for ex-
ample [Zlot, Stentz, 1984].
The purpose of this paper is to present a behaviour based
decentralised coordination approach to multi-objective
decision problems.
1.2 Approaches to multi-objective decision
problems
Since the pioneering work of Rosenthal [Rosenthal,
1984], many methods have been proposed for generating
solutions to the multi-objective decision problem, rang-
ing from various types of aggregation methods through
to lexicographic ordering, genetic algorithms and vot-
ing. For a comprehensive overview of these and other
methodologies, see [Coello, 1999].
For our purposes it is of particular interest to look at the
weighted aggregation method. The decision problem in
this case is stated as:
min/max
n  
i=1
wif(xi) (1)
n  
i=1
wi = 1 (2)
The question becomes; How are the weighting coeﬃ-
cients chosen? In the Constant Weighting Aggregationmethod, many arbitrary values for wi are chosen, and
the decision problem solved for each combination. In the
Dynamic Weighting Aggregation (DWA) method, wi is
changed continuously, either incrementally (following a
sinusoidal pattern) or suddenly (Bang-Bang aggregation
method) see [Jin,Olhoﬀer,Sendhoﬀ, 2001]. Note that in
the examples cited in the above, the DWA method ac-
counts for only two objectives and hence two weightings,
where w2 = 1 − w1. Furthermore, the decision makers
themselves have no input into the weighting assignment,
and the weightings may not necessarily reﬂect the re-
spective importance of the objective.
1.3 A diﬀerent approach to dynamic
weighting aggregation method
What is required in the dynamic weighting aggregation
method, is for the decision makers to be able to inﬂu-
ence the weighting assigned to each objective function,
and it is proposed that this be done by voting. Thus the
weighting is discretely changed at each time step, but not
arbitrarily. Additionally, the objective functions are all
deﬁned so as to be measured on the same scale allowing
the changing weights to reﬂect the changing importance
of each objective.
Since we are considering decision problems with many
entities and many (oftentimes competing) objective
functions, the novel voting process takes its inspiration
from society, which is also characterised by many entities
and many objectives. The ﬁeld of political science pro-
vides a rich theory of quantitative modeling of elections
and voting, to which we look as a basis for this model.
Methods of coordination for robots via voting have been
proposed previously, see for example [Pirjanian, 1998],
but these have been largely restricted to a single robot
with multiple objectives, and have not been modeled us-
ing a political science background.
2 Political science approach to
modeling elections
Beginning with the works of Downs [Downs, 1957], the
ﬁeld of political science has developed various methods
of modeling political elections, the core of which is the
fusion of voter behaviour and party behaviour.
2.1 Spatial model of elections
The use of a ‘spatial’ model of elections, based on an
m-dimensional Euclidean ‘issues’ space where both vot-
ers and parties are assumed to have spatial preferences,
has now become widely accepted as a legitimate basis for
modeling elections and parliaments [Ordeshook, 1993].
The dimensionality of the ‘issues’ space depends on the
number of issues at hand, and in its simplest form it
is a uni-dimensional (straight line) model. The spatial
preferences of voters, (termed ‘bliss points’) and the plat-
forms adopted by the parties as well as the parties’ ‘ideal
policies’ as represented by policy points, lie within this
issue space. Both voter’s bliss points, and party policy
points, are a quantitative measure of their stance on a
particular issue. Figure 1 gives a visual representation
of a spatial model of elections with an issue space of di-
mensionality three.
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Figure 1: Issue space for a three issue election with voter
bliss points and party ideal policy points
2.2 Voter model
In its most simplistic form assuming full information, the
voter model allows voters to assess each party’s position
(and hence vote for its most preferred party), based on
a calculation of utility to the voter from voting for that
party. Clearly, the utility function must be decreasing in
distance from voter bliss point. This utility is most often
characterised as the negative of the squared Euclidean
distance between voter i’s bliss point xik and party j’s
position xjk:
Uijk = −(xjk − xik)
2 (3)
That is, the utility to voter i of party j on issue k is the
distance between party j’s policy point on issue k and
voter i’s bliss point on issue k, squared.
Another often used form for utility is the ‘city block’
(absolute) distance between the two positions. This is
given as:
Uijk = −|(xjk − xik)| (4)
The total utility for voter i from party j, over all issues
is a simple summation of utilities across all issues:
Uij = −
 
k
 
(xjk − xik)
2
 
(5)The ﬁrst extention of this model, as presented in [Gill,
2004], recognises that there may be some non-issue fac-
tors aﬀecting voter utility, pertaining perhaps to the in-
dividual candidate or party, for example the voter’s per-
ception of a candidate’s honesty . This is modeled as:
Uextended
ij = Uij + Oij (6)
where Oij is the term accounting for these non-issue fac-
tors.
A further extension of the voter model takes account of
uncertainty in the world, thus a voter may only have
an expectation about a party platform, meaning only an
expected utility can be calculated:
E(Uij) = −
 
k
 
(E(xjk − xik))
2 − V ar(xijk)
 
+ Oij
(7)
From a political science perspective, this variance term
introduces complications, since it cannot be directly ob-
served, and thus an extra modiﬁcation is made to the
expected utility formulation, replacing the variance term
with an entropy term Hjk [Gill, 2004]:
E(Uij) = −
 
k
 
(E(xjk − xik))
2 − Hjk
 
+ Oij (8)
where the entropy is calculated based on probabilities p
from observations in some questionnaire data set, that
is:
Hjk = −plogp (9)
Note here, that this entropy term is not indexed by i,
as it is calculated based on the sample population of the
questionnaire, thus it is related to the party in question
rather than the individual voter.
The objective for the voter is to vote for the party giving
it maximum expected utility, by the above deﬁnitions of
utility, this occurs where voter bliss point and expected
party policy point are coincident on every issue. In this
case the utility to the voter is zero (perhaps counterin-
tuitively), and decreases with any increase in distance.
2.3 Party model
Party models have conventionally been divided into two
types, those of the ‘oﬃce-seeking’ party, and those of the
‘policy-motivated’ party.
The former has a policy platform (which is a vector of
policy points covering all issues), located at the point
of maximum expected probability of winning, regardless
of party ideology. In a two-party system, the utility ac-
cruing to this type of party (as deﬁned by the number
of votes by which it is ahead of its rival), is modeled
according to [Miller, Stadler, 1998] as:
Uj = Ej − Em (10)
Ej =
n  
i=1
P(Uij − Uim) (11)
Em = 1 − Ej (12)
where Ej is the expected number of votes for party j
and P(Uij − Uim) is the probability of voting for party
j, given the utility diﬀerence (Uij − Uim) between party
j and party m.
The policy-motivated party type is more bounded to its
ideal platform xideal
j , and hence utility as deﬁned by
[Smirnov,Fowler, 2003] is;
Ujk = −
 
xwin,k − x
ideal
jk
 2
(13)
where xwin,k is the winning party policy point on issue
k.
Recently, there has been an increase in literature relat-
ing to adaptive platform dynamics (see [Stadler, 1998]
for an introduction), recognising the ability of parties
to implement policy platform changes over time. One
approach taken to capture this dynamic process is to
consider an oﬃce-seeking party, where the party plat-
form changes based on a certain velocity deﬁned as the
derivative of the party’s utility function with respect to
the party policy point:
x′
jk =
dUjk
dxjk
(14)
This is referred to as local gradient hill-climbing.
3 Information theoretic model of
dynamic spatial elections
The formulation of the dynamic spatial election model in
an information theoretic context, adopts a ‘sensor’ based
approach to modeling both voters and parties. From the
voter’s perspective, the target state for sensing is the
platform position of the parties. The party’s target state
is however not so intuitive, being its own party platform
as it adapts over time. A constant velocity target model
is assumed, since we model the target state with a great
deal of uncertainty. The target state vector at time t
may be deﬁned as:
Xj(t) =






 


xj1
x′
j1
xj2
x′
j2
   
xjk
x′
jk






 


where xj1 is party j’s position on issue 1 and x′
j1 is party
j’s velocity on issue 1.We examine the information theoretic formulation of
voting through the use of a practical example of system
comprising ﬁve stationary sensors, trying to coordinate
over two objectives; target tracking and terrain observa-
tion. Thus we have a two issue model, and the above
target state is reduced to two issues, xj1 and xj2, and
their corresponding velocities.
The sensors receive expected utilities from both target
tracking and terrain observation in the form of mutual
information gain. The objective for each action is to
maximise utility, and we deﬁne the two objective func-
tions as f(track) and f(terrain). The importance at-
tached to each objective by each sensor is a normalised
weighting of the utilities, thus the ‘issue’ space is deﬁned
as a weighting w ∈ [0,1]. The sensor votes for the party
whose issue weighting most closely represents theirs.
The overall mission objective function is a weighted ag-
gregation of the individual objective functions, where the
weights are dynamically determined at each time step by
the voting protocol, indicating the importance of each
objective at and also therefore indicating what task each
UAV should conduct. The overall objective function can
therefore be represented by:
f(x) = wtrack × f(track) + wterrain × f(terrain) (15)
The objective constraints are a one to one sensor to
target assignment.
We assume the number of parties is always equal to the
number of mission objectives, this allows the ideal plat-
form of each party to capture an ‘extreme’ weighting for
each objective. For the sensor system example then, we
have a two party model where the ideal platforms of each
party are represented by:
 
xideal
1
xideal
2
 
j
=
 
wtrack
wterrain
 
j
=
 
0.9
0.1
 
1
=
 
0.1
0.9
 
2
A party is not a physical object unlike the voters, who
are the sensors. Rather, it is an information theoretic
algorithm.
Figure 2 captures the essence of this dynamic weighting
voting model for the example problem at hand.
3.1 Voter’s understanding of the world
The process model is a standard constant velocity model,
thus the target state is deﬁned as:
Xj(t + 1) = FXj(t) + wj(t) (16)
where
F =




1 dt 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 dt
0 0 0 1




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Figure 2: The Issue space for sensor multi-objective
problem, the two issues are ‘Weight assigned to target
tracking’ and ‘Weight assigned to terrain observation’
and wj(t) is the process noise, which is taken to be an un-
correlated Gaussian sequence with zero mean and vari-
ance deﬁned by:
Qj =

 

1/3dt3 1/2dt2 0 0
1/2dt2 dt 0 0
0 0 1/3dt3 1/2dt2
0 0 1/2dt2 1/3dt3

 
σ2
j
The term σ2
j is the target noise variance, which is de-
pendent on the change in party j’s mandate over the
last two time steps, that is;
σ2
j =
votesj(t − 1) − votesj(t − 2)
votesj(t − 2)
(17)
Therefore, σ2
j comes from the population of voter’s, and
is related to the target (party), rather than to an indi-
vidual sensor (voter).
The observation model is based on a ‘city block’ distance
between party platform and voter bliss point, the obser-
vations for voter i of party j being an inverse of this
measure (this is because we will be maximising an in-
formation space measure of utility based on observation,
thus the smaller the city block distance, the larger the
observation metric).
Zij(t) = h(xj(t),xi(t)) (18)
Zij(t) =
 
1/|(xj1(t) − xi1(t))|
1/|(xj2(t) − xi2(t))|
 
+ vi(t) (19)The term vi(t) is the observation noise at time t, which
is an uncorrelated Gaussian sequence having zero mean,
and a variance R dependent on an entropic measure of
win likelihood at time t Hj(t), where;
Hj(t) = −pj logpj (20)
pj = votesj(t − 1)/votetotal(t − 1) (21)
and
Rj =
 
Hj(t) 0
0 Hj(t)
 
votesj(t − 1) is the number of votes received by party j
at time (t−1), and votetotal(t−1) is the total number of
votes at time (t−1). The variance R is thus not depen-
dent on the sensing perception of the voter,but rather
on the strength (in terms of votes) of the party being
sensed.
The Jacobian of the observation model with respect to
the target state is then deﬁned as:
▽xjh(xj(t),xi(t))=
 
−1/(|(xj1−xi1)|)2 0
0 −1/(|(xj2−xi2)|)2
 
Transformation from state space to information space
takes its usual form, as do the prediction and update
stages of the information ﬁlter, as outlined in [Grochol-
sky, 2002].
The expected utility to the voter is based on the polit-
ical science deﬁnition of utility (‘city block distance’),
and thus must be directly derived from the observation.
It is formulated as:
E(Uij)(t) = 1/2log((2πe)
n(
 
yij(t))) (22)
where for a voter interested in estimating four states,
n = 4, and yij(t) is the information vector at time t.
The voter votes for the party yielding the highest ex-
pected utility.
3.2 Party’s understanding of the world
Party platforms (as the parties’ target state) are also
modeled using the standard constant velocity process
model. An assumption is made that the party ‘type’
is a mixture of oﬃce-seeking and policy motivated. The
utility function for a party j with a given position xkj
on issue k is therefore deﬁned as:
Ujk = −
 
(xwin,k − xjk)
2 + (x
ideal
jk − xjk)
2 
(23)
where xwin,k is the winning party’s position on issue k,
and xideal
jk is party j’s ideal position on issue k. We must
bare in mind that the ideal case (yielding the party max-
imum utility), is where xwin,k = xjk = xideal
jk for all k.
In this situation, the velocity of adaptation also becomes
zero.
Initially, the velocity of platform adaptation (the deriv-
ative of Ujk with respect to xjk), is zero, since ideally
the party would like to win based on its ideal platform
position. Changes in velocity occur only at the observa-
tion stage.
The process model is given in equation 16, with F de-
ﬁned similarly. Q, the variance of target noise changes,
in the σj term, which now represents the relative change
in mandate strength for party j compared to the other
party. Thus:
σ2
j =
votesj(t−1)−votesj(t−2)
votesj(t−2)
votesj(t−1)−votesj(t−2)
votesj(t−2) +
votesm(t−1)−votesm(t−2)
votesm(t−2)
(24)
The observation model consists of four observations cor-
responding to the two issues and the two respective ve-
locities. The velocity for adaptation is the derivative of
the utility function deﬁned in equation 23. The observa-
tion vector for party j is then deﬁned as:
Zj(t)=




|(xideal
j1 −xj1(t))+(xideal
j2 −xj2(t))|
2(xwin,1(t−1)−xj1(t))+2(xideal
j1 −xj1(t))
|(xwin,1(t−1)−xj1(t))+(xwin,2(t−1)−xj2(t))|
2(xwin,2(t−1)−xj2(t))+2(xideal
j2 −xj2(t))




+vj(t) (25)
The observation noise, vj(t) is uncorrelated Gaussian
white noise with a variance R dependent on the strength
of the previous time step’s winning party’s platform,
a(t). That is;
a(t) = −g(t)logg(t) (26)
g(t) = votewin(t − 1)/votetotal(t − 1) (27)
where votewin is the number of votes received by the
winning party of time (t − 1), and
Rj =




a(t) 0 0 0
0 a(t) 0 0
0 0 a(t) 0
0 0 0 a(t)




The corresponding observation Jacobian is:
▽xjh(xj(t),xideal
j ,xwin(t)) =

 

1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

 

3.3 Results
The results presented in the ﬁgures below show the dy-
namic election and voting process. Figure 3 shows the
bliss points of each sensor in Issue space over time.These bliss points correspond to their preferred platform
position and is based on the utility they receive from each
objective.
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Figure 3: The bliss points of each sensor (as determined
by their respective weightings of the two objectives; track
target, observe terrain) in Issue space
Figure 4 shows the party platforms dynamically ad-
justing in issue space, as they consider their ideal policy
and the winning party’s policy.
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Figure 4: Adaptive party platforms; the parties make
observations of previous elections, and update their state
estimates (weightings for the two objectives) accordingly
We observe that although the two parties initially of-
fered platforms based on their ideal policy points, the
ability to update platform positions based on ‘learning’
what the mandate wants, has seen an obvious conver-
gence of policy positions. This policy convergence is a
recognised phenomenon in the political science model
of two party (oﬃce-seeking type) spatial elections. In
Downs’ ([Downs, 1957]) classic two party model com-
plete convergence to the median of voter positions is pre-
dicted.
On the other hand, for policy motivated parties in two
party elections, a certain degree of policy divergence is
usually predicted [Wittman, 1990].
It is because of the inherent assumption we have made
that the party types are mixed, and furthermore that the
utility accruing to a party (and hence velocity) is equally
dependent on the distance from the winning platform
and distance from ideal platform, that we see only a de-
gree of convergence between party policy platforms.
Figure 5 shows the velocity with which parties change
their platforms, as deﬁned by the derivative of their re-
spective utilities.
0 2 4 6 8 10
−10
0
10
20
30
40
Velocities of adaptation
V
e
l
o
c
i
t
y
 
I
s
s
u
e
 
O
n
e Party One velocity Issue One
Party Two velocity Issue One
0 2 4 6 8 10
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
time (s)
V
e
l
o
c
i
t
y
 
I
s
s
u
e
 
T
w
o Party One velocity Issue Two
Party Two velocity Issue Two
Figure 5: The velocity with which the parties’ platforms
adapt, based on observations from previous election
And ﬁnally, Figure 6 shows the tally of votes for each
party over time. Given that in this sensor system exam-
ple party one wins all the time, observing ﬁgure 5, and
noting the mathematical deﬁnition for adaptive velocity,
we can conclude that the velocity of adaptation for party
one depends only on the diﬀerence between its ideal pol-
icy and its actual policy. It is this positive velocity that
keeps the policy position for party one from diverging
away from its ideal policy further than it has.
On both issues, the changes in velocity are initially much
larger for party two (since it is aﬀected by both the win-
ning policy and its ideal policy). The change in policy
position is thus quite rapid, and the magnitude of the
divergence from ideal policy position on both issues is
larger than for party one, as is expected.0 2 4 6 8 10
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Figure 6: Vote tally; number of sensors voting for each
party at every ‘election’, based on maximising expected
utility to the sensor
The implications of this for the dynamic weighting ag-
gregation method are straightforward. The weighting
assigned to each objective is given by the platform of
party one. In this case, tracking targets has a higher
weighting than terrain observation at each time step,
and thus optimisation of target tracking takes priority.
4 Conclusion and future work
A dynamic coordination method for multi-objective
problems was presented. The formulation (based around
a dynamic weighting aggregation approach) uses con-
cepts established in the political science ﬁeld, namely the
modeling of elections, mapped into information space.
This information theoretic formulation is then applied
to a simplistic multi-objective coordination problem to
test its feasibility.
The example allows us to observe the inner working of
the dynamic weighting, and demonstrates its usefulness
in coordinating a group of sensors within the scope of a
two objective mission. The sensors, as voters, do indeed
vote for the party closest in weighting to them, whilst
the parties adapt their platforms based a combination
of ‘learning’ what the mandate wants, and preconceived
preferences.
The example presented provides motivation to extend
the application of this multi-objective methodology to
systems with a large number (in the order of 10-100) of
entities trying to coordinate over multiple objectives. It
is envisaged that this methodology be applied to large
systems of cooperative UAV’s, but is certainly not re-
stricted to this application.
As the system grows in complexity, and more parties are
added in accordance with the increased mission objec-
tives, the majoritarian electoral system being used may
not yield a clear winning party. In this case, the party
model is extended to allow for coalition formation based
on the ‘minimal winning connected’ concept, see [Axel-
rod, 1970].
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